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Abstract
Animals living in groups make movement decisions
that depend, among other factors, on social inter-
actions with other group members. Our present
understanding of social rules in animal collectives
is mainly based on empirical fits to observations,
with less emphasis in obtaining first-principles ap-
proaches that allow their derivation. Here we show
that patterns of collective decisions can be derived
from the basic ability of animals to make proba-
bilistic estimations in the presence of uncertainty.
We build a decision-making model with two stages:
Bayesian estimation and probabilistic matching. In
the first stage, each animal makes a Bayesian esti-
mation of which behavior is best to perform taking
into account personal information about the envi-
ronment and social information collected by observ-
ing the behaviors of other animals. In the proba-
bility matching stage, each animal chooses a be-
havior with a probability equal to the Bayesian-
estimated probability that this behavior is the most
appropriate one. This model derives very simple
rules of interaction in animal collectives that de-
pend only on two types of reliability parameters,
one that each animal assigns to the other animals
and another given by the quality of the non-social
information. We test our model by obtaining the-
oretically a rich set of observed collective patterns
of decisions in three-spined sticklebacks, Gasteros-
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teus aculeatus, a shoaling fish species. The quanti-
tative link shown between probabilistic estimation
and collective rules of behavior allows a better con-
tact with other fields such as foraging, mate selec-
tion, neurobiology and psychology, and gives predic-
tions for experiments directly testing the relation-
ship between estimation and collective behavior.
Author Summary
Animals need to act on uncertain data and with lim-
ited cognitive abilities to survive. It is well known
that our sensory and sensorimotor processing uses
probabilistic estimation as a means to counteract
these limitations. Indeed, the way animals learn,
forage or select mates is well explained by proba-
bilistic estimation. Social animals have an inter-
esting new opportunity since the behavior of other
members of the group provides a continuous flow of
indirect information about the environment. This
information can be used to improve their estima-
tions of environmental factors. Here we show that
this simple idea can derive basic interaction rules
that animals use for decisions in social contexts.
In particular, we show that the patterns of choice
of Gasterosteus aculeatus correspond very well to
probabilistic estimation using the social informa-
tion. The link found between estimation and col-
lective behavior should help to design experiments
of collective behavior testing for the importance of
estimation as a basic property of how brains work.
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Introduction
Animals need to make decisions without certainty
in which option is best. This uncertainty is due to
the ambiguity of sensory data but also to limited
processing capabilities, and is an intrinsic and gen-
eral property of the representation that animals can
build about the world. A general way to make deci-
sions in uncertain situations is to make probabilistic
estimations [1, 2]. There is evidence that animals
use probabilistic estimations, for example in the
early stages of sensory perception [3–11], sensory-
motor transformations [12–14], learning [15–17] and
behaviors in an ecological context such as strategies
for food patch exploitation [18–20] and mate selec-
tion [21], among others [13, 17, 21, 22].
An additional source of information about the en-
vironment may come from the behavior of other an-
imals (social information) [23–28]. This informa-
tion can have different degrees of ambiguity. In
particular cases, the behavior of conspecifics di-
rectly reveals environmental characteristics (for ex-
ample, food encountered by another individual in-
forms about the quality of a food patch). Cases
in which social information correlates well with the
environmental characteristic of interest have been
very well studied [29–37]. But in most cases so-
cial information is ambiguous and potentially mis-
leading [26, 38]. In spite of this ambiguity, there is
evidence that in some cases such as predator avoid-
ance [39, 40] and mate choice [41], animals use this
kind of information.
Social animals have a continuous flow of infor-
mation about the environment coming from the be-
haviours of other animals. It is therefore possible
that social animals use it at all times, making prob-
abilistic estimations to counteract its ambiguity. If
this is the case, estimation of the environment using
both non-social and social information might be a
major determinant of the structure of animal col-
lectives. In order to test this hypothesis, we have
developed a Bayesian decision-making model that
includes both personal and social information, that
naturally weights them according to their reliabil-
ity in order to get a better estimate of the environ-
ment. All members of the group can then use these
improved estimations to make better decisions, and
collective patterns of decisions then emerge from
these individuals interacting through their percep-
tual systems.
We show that this model derives social rules
that economically explain detailed experiments of
decision-making in animal groups [42,43]. This ap-
proach should complement the empirical approach
used in the study of animal groups [42–47], finding
which mathematical functions should correspond to
each experimental problem and to propose exper-
iments relating estimation and collective motion.
The Bayesian structure of our model also builds a
bridge between the field of collective behavior and
other fields of animal behavior, such as optimal for-
aging theory [18–22] and others [21,22]. Further, it
explicitly includes in a natural way different cogni-
tive abilities, making more direct contact with neu-
robiology and psychology [3–10,17].
Results
Estimation model
We derived a model in which each individual de-
cides from an estimation of which behavior is best
to perform. These behaviors can be to go to one
of several different places, to choose among some
behaviors like forage, explore or run away, or any
other set of options. For clarity, here we particular-
ize to the case of choosing the best of two spatial
locations, x and y (see Text S1 for more than two
options). ‘Best’ may correspond to the safest, the
one with highest food density or most interesting for
any other reasons. We assume that each decision
maker uses in the estimation of the best location
both non-social and social information. Non-social
information may include sensory information about
the environment (i.e. shelter properties, potential
predators, food items), memory of previous experi-
ences and internal states. Social information con-
sists of the behaviors performed by other decision-
makers. Each individual estimates the probability
that each location, say y, is the best one, using its
non-social information (C) and the behavior of the
other individuals (B),
P (Y |C,B), (1)
where Y stands for ’y is the best location’.
P (X |C,B) = 1−P (Y |C,B), because there are only
two locations to choose from. We can compute the
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probability in Eq. 1 using Bayes’ theorem,
P (Y |C,B) =
P (B|Y,C)P (Y |C)
P (B|X,C)P (X |C) + P (B|Y,C)P (Y |C)
. (2)
By simply dividing numerator and denominator by
the numerator we find an interesting structure,
P (Y |C,B) =
1
1 + aS
, (3)
where
a =
P (X |C)
P (Y |C)
(4)
and
S =
P (B|X,C)
P (B|Y,C)
. (5)
Note that a does not contain any social information
so it can be understood as the“non-social term”
of the estimation. We can also understand S as
the “social term” because it contains all the social
information, although is also depends on the non-
social information C. The non-social term a is the
likelihood ratio for the two options given only the
non-social information. This kind of likelihood ra-
tio is the basis of Bayesian decision-making in the
absence of social information [5, 11–14]. Eq. 3 now
tells us that this well known term interacts with the
social term S simply through multiplication.
We are seeking a model based on probabilistic
estimation that can simultaneously give us insight
into social decision-making and fit experimental
data. For this reason we simplify the model by as-
suming that the focal individual does not make use
of the correlations among the behaviour of others,
but instead assumes their behaviours to be indepen-
dent of each other. This is a strong hypothesis but
allows us to derive simple explicit expressions with
important insights. The section ‘Model including
dependencies’ at the end of Results shows that this
assumption gives a very good approximation to a
more complete model that takes into account these
correlations.
The assumption of independence translates in
that the probability of a given set of behaviors is
just the product of the probabilities of the indi-
vidual behaviors. We apply it to the probabilities
needed to compute S in Eq. 5, getting
P (B|Y,C) = Z
N∏
i=1
P (bi|Y,C), (6)
where B is the set of all the behaviors of the other
N animals at the time the focal individual chooses,
B = {bi}
N
i=1, and bi denotes the behavior of one
of them, individual i. Z is a combinatorial term
counting the number of possible decision sequences
that lead to the set of behaviors B, that will cancel
out in the next step. Substituting Eq. 6 and the
corresponding expression for P (B|X,C) into Eq. 5,
we get
S =
N∏
i=1
P (bi|X,C)
P (bi|Y,C)
. (7)
Instead of an expression in terms of as many be-
haviors as individuals, it may be more useful to
consider a discrete set of behavioral classes. For
example, in our two-choice example, these behav-
ioral classes may be ‘go to x’ (denoted βx), ‘go to
y’ (βy) and ‘remain undecided’ (βu). Frequently,
these behavioral classes (or simply ‘behaviors’) will
be directly related to the choices, so that each be-
havior will consist of choosing one option. For ex-
ample, behaviors βx and βy are directly related to
choices x and y, respectively. But there may be
behaviors not related to any option as the case
of indecision, βu, or related to choices in an indi-
rect way. These behaviors can still be informative
because they may be more consistent with one of
the options being better than the other (for exam-
ple, indecision may increase when there is a preda-
tor, so the presence of undecided individuals may
bias the decision against the place where the non-
social information suggests the presence of a preda-
tor). Let us consider L different behavioral classes,
{βk}
L
k=1. We do not here consider individual dif-
ferences for animals performing the same behavior
(say, behavior β1), so they have the same probabili-
ties P (β1|X,C) and P (β1|Y,C). Thus, if for exam-
ple the n1 first individuals are performing behavior
β1, we have that
∏n1
i=1
P (bi|X,C)
P (bi|Y,C)
=
(
P (β1|X,C)
P (β1|Y,C)
)n1
.
We can then write Eq. 7 as
S =
L∏
k=1
snkk , (8)
where nk is the number of individuals performing
behavior βk, and
sk =
P (βk|X,C)
P (βk|Y,C)
. (9)
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The term sk is the probability that an individual
performs behavior βk when x is the best option,
over the probability that it performs the same be-
havior when y is the best choice. The higher sk the
more reliably behavior βk indicates that x is better
than y, so we can understand sk as the reliability
parameter of behavior βk. If sk =∞, observing be-
havior βk indicates with complete certainty that x
is the best option, while for sk = 1 behavior βk gives
no information. For sk < 1, observing behavior βk
favors y as the best option, and more so the closer
it is to 0. Note that P (βk|X,C) and P (βk|Y,C)
are not the actual probabilities of performing be-
havior βk, but estimates of these probabilities that
the deciding animal uses to assess the reliability of
the other decision-makers. These estimates may be
‘hard-wired’ as a result of evolutionary adaptation,
but may also be subject to change due to learning.
To summarize, using Eqs. 3 and 8, the probabil-
ity that y is the best choice, given both social and
non-social information is
P (Y |C,B) =
(
1 + a
L∏
k=1
snkk
)−1
, (10)
with a in Eq. 4 and sk in Eq. 9.
Decision rule: Probability matching
We have so far only considered the perceptual stage
of decision-making, in which the deciding individ-
ual estimates the probability that each behavior is
the best one. Now it must decide according to this
estimation. A simple decision rule would be to go
to y when P (Y |C,B) is above a certain threshold.
This rule maximizes the amount of correct choices
when the probabilities do not change [48], but is
not consistent with the experimental data consid-
ered in this paper. Applying this deterministic rule
strictly, without any noise sources, one would ob-
tain that all individuals behave exactly in the same
way when facing the same stimuli, but in the exper-
iments considered here this is not the case. Instead,
we used a different decision rule called probability
matching, that has been experimentally observed
in many species, from insects to humans [49–55].
According to this rule an individual chooses each
option with a probability that is equal to the prob-
ability that it is the best choice. Therefore, in our
case the probability of going to y (Py), is the same
as the estimated probability that y is the best loca-
tion (P (Y |C,B)), so
Py = P (Y |C,B). (11)
Probability matching does not maximize the
amount of right choices if we assume that the prob-
abilities stay always the same, but in many circum-
stances it can be the optimal behavior, such as when
there is competition for resources [56,57], when the
estimated probabilities are expected to change due
to learning [53, 55], or for other reasons [53, 58].
Finally, using Eqs. 10 and 11 we have that the
probability that the deciding individual goes to y is
Py =
(
1 + a
L∏
k=1
snkk
)−1
. (12)
The assumption of probability matching has the ad-
vantage that the final expression for the decision in
Eq. 12 is identical to the one given by Bayesian esti-
mation in Eq. 10, with no extra parameters. Alter-
native decision rules could be noisy versions of the
threshold rule, but at the price of adding at least
one extra parameter to describe the noise. Also, de-
cision rules might not depend on estimation alone,
but also on other factors or constraints. These more
complicated rules fall beyond the scope of this pa-
per.
In the following sections, we particularize Eq. 12
to different experimental settings to test its results
against existing rich experimental data sets that
have previously been fitted to different mathemati-
cal expressions [42, 43].
Symmetric set-up
We first considered the simple case of two identi-
cal equidistant sites, x and y, Fig. 1A. For a set-
up made symmetric by experimental design there
is no true best option. But deciding individuals
must act, like for any other case, using only their
incomplete sensory data to make the best possible
decision. Even when non-social sensory data indi-
cates no relevant difference between the two sites,
the social information can bias the estimation of the
best option to one of the two sites.
Using Eq. 12 and that the three possible behav-
iors are ‘go to x’ (βx), ‘go to y’ (βy) and ‘remain
undecided’ (βu), we obtain
Py =
(
1 + a snxx s
ny
y s
N−nx−ny
u
)−1
, (13)
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Figure 1. Model with individuals estimating which
of two identical places is best. (A) Schematic diagram
of individuals choosing between two identical locations x and
y when there are already nx (ny) individuals at x (y). (B)
Probability of going to y as a function of the difference be-
tween the number of individuals at y and x, Eq. 17. (C ) Se-
quential application of the behavioural rule in Eq. 17 with
s = 2.5, for the simple case of a group of two individuals
(bottom). The width of the arrows is proportional to the
probability of each transition. The 3 possible final configu-
rations, with different proportion of individuals going to y
(0, 0.5 and 1), have different probabilities of taking place,
with both fish together at x or y being more probable than
a group split (top).
where nx and ny are the number of individuals
that have already chosen x and y, respectively, and
N + 1 is the size of the group containing our fo-
cal individual and other N animals. As the set-
up is symmetric, the sensory information available
to the deciding individual is the same for both op-
tions so P (X |C) = P (Y |C) and then a = 1 ac-
cording to Eq. 4. Also, since indecision is not re-
lated to any particular choice, symmetry imposes
P (βu|X,C) = P (βu|Y,C), so indecision is not in-
formative, su = 1 (Eq. 9). For the other two be-
haviors, going to x (βx) and going to y (βy), Eq. 9
gives
sx =
P (βx|X,C)
P (βx|Y,C)
sy =
P (βy|X,C)
P (βy|Y,C)
.
(14)
P (βx|X,C) and P (βy|Y,C) are the estimated prob-
abilities of making the right choice, that is, going
to x when x is the best option, or going to y when
y is the best option. Since in this case the sensory
information is identical for both options, the proba-
bility of making the correct choice must be the same
for both options, P (βx|X,C) = P (βy|Y,C). An
analogous argument holds for the incorrect choices,
P (βx|Y,C) = P (βy|X,C), giving
sx = 1/sy. (15)
In cases in which sx = 1/sy, we find it convenient
to express reliability more generally as
s ≡ sx = 1/sy, (16)
which is the ratio of the probability of making the
correct choice and the probability of making a mis-
take, for both behaviors. Using this definition and
given that a = au = 1, Eq. 13 reduces to
Py =
(
1 + s−∆n
)−1
, (17)
with the variable ∆n ≡ ny − nx. Eq. 17 describes
a sigmoidal function that is steeper the higher the
higher the value of s (Fig. 1B). Therefore, for very
reliable behaviors (high s, meaning individuals that
are much more likely to make correct choices than
erroneous ones), Py grows fast with ∆n and the
deciding individual then goes to y with high prob-
ability when taking into account the behaviors of
only very few individuals.
The behavior of the group is obtained by apply-
ing the decision rule in Eq. 17 sequentially to each
individual (see Methods). After each behavioural
choice, we update the number of individuals at x
and y, using the new nx and ny for the next decid-
ing individual (Fig. 1C, bottom). Repeating this
procedure for all the individuals in the group, we
can compute the probability for each possible final
outcome of the experiment (Fig. 1C, top).
The relevance of the symmetric case is that the
model has a single parameter and a single variable,
enabling a powerful comparison against experimen-
tal data. We tested the model using an existing
rich data set of collective decisions in three-spined
sticklebacks [42], a shoaling fish species. This data
set was obtained using a group of Ntot fish choosing
between two identical refugia, one on their left and
another one on their right (Fig. 2A), equivalent to
locations x and y in the model (Fig. 1A). At the
start of the experiment, mx (my) replica fish made
of resin were moved along lines on the left (right)
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towards the refugia (Fig. 2A). The experimental re-
sults consisted on the statistics of collective deci-
sions between the two refugia for 19 different cases
using different group sizes Ntot = 2, 4 or 8 and
different numbers of replicas going left and right,
mx : my = {1:1, 2:2, 0:1, 1:2, 0:2, 1:3, 0:3} (Fig. 2B,
blue histograms). To compare against these exper-
imental data, we calculated the probability of find-
ing a collective pattern applying the individual be-
havioural rule in Eq. 17 iteratively over each fish
for the 19 experimental settings. We found a good
fit of the model to the experimental data using for
the 19 graphs the same value s = 2.2 (Fig. 2B, red
line). The model is robust, with good fits in the
interval s = 2-4 (Fig. 3, red line).
Despite the simplicity of the behavioral rule in
Eq. 17, it reproduces the experimental results, in-
cluding the dependence on the total number of fish
Ntot, even though the rule is independent of this
parameter, except for determining the range of pos-
sible values of ∆n. The dependence of the final dis-
tributions on Ntot emerges from the application of
the rule to the Ntot individuals in the group, as is
illustrated in Fig. 4. Each small box represents a
state of the system in which nx : ny fish have al-
ready decided to go to x and y, respectively. The
lines connecting each box with another two boxes
on top represent the decision made by the next de-
ciding individual, that takes the system to the next
state. The width of the lines is proportional to the
probability of the decision. As more individuals de-
cide, the central states become less likely simply
because they accumulate more unlikely decisions.
Therefore, the U-shape or J-shape becomes more
pronounced for larger groups, even though the in-
dividual decision rule in Eq. 17 is independent of
the total number of individuals Ntot.
Group decision-making in three-spined stickle-
backs shows a single type of distribution in which
probability is minimum at the center and increases
monotonically towards the edges, denoted here as
U-shaped distribution (or J-shaped when there is
a bias to one of the two options). However, the
model in Eq. 17 also gives two other types of dis-
tributions, Fig. 5A. For non-social behavior (s = 1)
the histogram is bell-shaped due to combinatorial
effects. However, a bell-shape is also compati-
ble with social animals for a certain range of s
and group size (white region on the bottom-left of
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Figure 2. Comparison between model and stickle-
back choices in symmetric set-up. (A) Schematic dia-
gram of symmetric set-up with a group of sticklebacks (in
black) choosing between two identical refugia and with dif-
ferent numbers of replica fish (in red) going to x and y. (B)
Experimentally measured statistics of final configurations of
fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue his-
togram) and results from the model in Eq. 17 in the main
text (red line using reliability parameter s = 2.2; red region:
95% confidence interval; green line with s = 2.5). Different
graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and
different number of replicas going to x and y.
Fig. 5A). For higher values of s, the histograms are
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(plots in Fig. 7; Parameter a is re-optimized for each value
of s). (A) Root mean squared error between the data and the
probabilities predicted by the model. Grey dashed line shows
the mean RMSE for the three cases. The absolute values
for each case depend on the shape of the data and are not
comparable, only the trends and the position of the minima
should be compared. (B) Logarithm of the probability that
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Grey dashed line shows the sum of the three coloured lines,
but shifted by 1000 so that it fits on the scale. The peak of
this global probability indicates the value of s that best fits
the three datasets (s = 2.5).
M-shaped, with two maxima located between the
center and the sides (region coloured in black and
blue in Fig. 5A). However, the M shape becomes
clear only with enough number of bins because the
drop in probability near the edge or at the center
of the distribution disappears when binning is too
coarse, producing a bell-shaped or U-shaped his-
togram, Fig. 5B. This is an important practical is-
sue, because the amount of data that can be col-
lected rarely allows for more than 5 bins. The col-
orscale in Fig. 5A reflects the number of bins needed
to observe the M shape (black has been reserved for
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Figure 4. Illustration of the decision-making process
in the model. Bottom: Decision-making process accord-
ing to Eq. 17 (with s = 2.5). Time runs from bottom to top.
Each box represents a state with a given number of fish hav-
ing already decided x or y (nx : ny). Each state can lead to
another two states in the following time step, depending on
whether the focal fish decides to go to x or y. The width of
the lines connecting states is proportional to the probability
of that transition (equal to the probability of the prior state
times the probability of the focal fish making the decision
that leads to the later one). Top: Probability of each state
after 8 fish have made their decisions. (A) Case with no
replicas, in which the final outcome is U-shaped. (B) Case
with one replica going to y (so initial state is already 0:1), in
which the final outcome is J-shaped.
exactly 5 bins). For high values of s, the histograms
are U-shaped (white region on the top of Fig. 5A).
Also, all the M-region above the black zone becomes
of type U when the binning is too coarse.
An interesting prediction of our model is that, for
a given number of bins, the shape of the distribu-
tion of choices changes with the number of decided
individuals, and the dynamics of this change de-
pends on s. For high values of s, the probability is
U-shaped from the beginning and becomes steeper
as more individuals decide (as is the case for the
stickleback dataset), Fig. 5C. For lower values of
s, we observe M-shaped distributions for the first
individuals and then U-shaped ones when more in-
dividuals decide, Fig. 5D. For even lower values of
s, we observe bell-shaped distributions for the first
individuals, then M-shaped and finally U-shaped,
Fig. 5E,F.
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Figure 5. Types of distributions and dynamics for
different values of reliability parameter s and group
size. (A) Shape of histogram of final configurations as a
function of s and the group size. Bell-shaped: white region
on the bottom-left. M-shaped: region coloured in black and
blue. As the observation of the M shape depends on the
number of bins, the colorscale reflects the number of bins
needed to observe the M shape (black has been reserved for
exactly 5 bins). U-shape: white region on the top. Also,
all the M-region above the black zone becomes U when the
binning is too coarse. There is also a small region below the
black zone where the M shape becomes a bell shape when
the binning is too coarse. (B) Dependence of the apparent
shape on the number of bins: Top, 80 bins. Middle, 10 bins.
Bottom, 5 bins. On the left, a probability that seems U-
shaped for 5 bins, but is M shaped for a higher number of
bins. On the right, a probability that stays M-shaped for any
number of bins. (C-F ) Dynamics of the probability as the
number of individuals increases for (C ) s = 2, (D) s = 1.62,
(E) s = 1.35 and (F ) s = 1.05.
Symmetric set-up with modified replicas
of animals
An interesting modification of the experimental set-
up consists in using replicas of the animals that we
can modify to potentially alter their reliability es-
timated by the animals. We considered the par-
ticular case, motivated by experiments in [43], of
two types of modified replicas with different char-
acteristics (for example, fat or thin), Fig. 6A. We
considered 7 behaviors: ‘animal goes to x’ (βfx),
‘animal goes to y’ (βfy), ‘most attractive replica
goes to x’ (βRx), ‘most attractive replica goes to
y’ (βRy) ‘least attractive replica goes to x’ (βrx),
‘least attractive replica goes to y’ (βry), and ’ani-
mal remains undecided’ (βfu). The probability of
going to y in Eq. 12 then reduces to
Py =(
1 + a snfxfx s
nfy
fy s
nRx
Rx s
nRy
Ry s
nrx
rx s
nry
ry s
Nf−nfx−nfy
fu
)−1
,
(18)
where subindex ‘f’ refers to real fish and ‘R’ (‘r’) to
replicas of the most (least) attractive type. As in
the previous section, symmetry imposes that a = 1
and sfu = 1. It also imposes the following relations
between the reliability parameters, sf ≡ sfx = 1/sfy,
sR ≡ sRx = 1/sRy, sr ≡ srx = 1/sry. Therefore,
Py =
(
1 + s−∆nff s
−∆nR
R s
−∆nr
r
)−1
, (19)
where ∆nf ≡ nfy − nfx, ∆nR ≡ nRy − nRx and
∆nr ≡ nry −nrx. In the particular case of only two
different replicas, one going to x and the other to y
and for notational simplicity taking the convention
that the most (least) attractive replica goes to y
(x), we have ∆nR = 1 and ∆nr = −1. Therefore,
Py =
(
1 +
sr
sR
s−∆nff
)−1
. (20)
Note that the probability in Eq. 20 does not de-
pend on sr and sR separately, but only on their ra-
tio. Therefore, in this case the model uses only two
parameters (sf and sr/sR). We compared the model
with the stickleback data set from [43], Fig. 6. The
data in Fig. 6B has a different type of replica pair in
each row, so in principle we would fit a different ra-
tio sr/sR for each row. But note that the first three
rows correspond to experiments with the same three
replicas (large, medium and small), combined in dif-
ferent pairs. The same can be said for the second
and third threesomes of rows. Therefore, there are
only two free parameters for each three rows. On
the other hand, sf should have the same value for all
cases. The model again reproduces the experimen-
tal results reported in reference [43] , obtaining the
best fit for sf = 2.9 (Fig. 6B). The result is robust,
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with good fits for sf = 2-4 (Fig. 3, green line) in
accord with the value obtained for the case shown
in Fig. 2B.
Asymmetric set-up
We finally considered the case in which sites x and
y are different and the three behaviors are ‘go to
x’ (βx), ‘go to y’ (βy) and ‘remain undecided’ (βu).
Eq. 12 reduces to
Py =
(
1 + a snxx s
ny
y s
N−nx−ny
u
)−1
. (21)
The term a = P (X |C)/P (Y |C) represents the non-
social information and in general a 6= 1 because the
set-up is asymmetric by design. This asymmetry
might also affect how a deciding animal takes into
account the behaviours of other animals depend-
ing on which side they chose, making in general
sx 6= 1/sy. Also, indecision might be informative.
For example, if non-social information indicates the
possible presence of a predator at y, the indecision
of other animals might confirm this to the deciding
individual, further biasing the decision towards x.
Therefore, we may have su 6= 1. But it may also
be the case that the set-up’s asymmetry does not
affect the social terms, so we also tested a simpler
model in which s ≡ sx = 1/sy and su = 1, giving
Py =
(
1 + a s−∆n
)−1
. (22)
The stickleback dataset reported in reference [42]
is ideally suited to test the asymmetric model for
the experiments that were performed with a replica
predator at the right arm (Fig. 7A). The model in
Eq. 22 fits best the data with s = 2.6 (Fig. 7B) and
it is robust with a good fit in s = 2-4 (Fig. 3, blue
line). The more complex model in Eq. 21 gives fits
very similar to those of simpler model. Specifically,
parameter su was rejected by the Bayes Information
Criterion [59, 60], suggesting that fish do not rely
on undecided individuals. The fact that fish rely
differently on other fish depending on the option
they have taken could not be ruled out by the Bayes
Information Criterion, but in any case the impact
of this difference on the data is small.
In the experiments in Fig. 2 and Fig. 7, we have
assumed that the replicas are perceived by fish as
real animals. However, it is reasonable to think
that fish might perceive the difference, and rely dif-
ferently on replicas and real fish. To test this, we
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Figure 6. Comparison between model and stickle-
back choices with two differently modified replicas.
(A) Schematic diagram of symmetric set-up with a group of
sticklebacks (in black) choosing between two identical refugia
and with one replica fish going to x and a different one (in
size, shape or pattern) going to y (in red). (B) Experimen-
tally measured statistics of final configurations of fish choices
from 20 experimental repetitions [43] (blue histogram) and
results from model in Eq. 20 in the main text (red line using
reliability parameter sf = 2.9 and sr/sR = 0.35, 0.7, 0.5,
0.52, 0.69, 0.75, 0.43, 0.55, 0.78, 0.43, for each row from top
to bottom; red region: 95% confidence interval; green line
with sf = 2.5 and same ratios sr/sR as for red line). Dif-
ferent graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes
and different types of replicas going to x and y.
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Figure 7. Comparison between model and stickle-
back choices in asymmetric set-up. (A) Schematic dia-
gram of asymmetric set-up (predator at y, large fish depicted
in red) with a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing be-
tween two refugia, and replica fish (small fish depicted in red)
going to y. (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final
configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repeti-
tions [42] (blue histogram) and results from model in Eq. 22
in the main text (red line using s = 2.6, a = 9.5; red region:
95% confidence interval. Green line using s = 2.5 and same
a as for red line). Different graphs correspond to different
stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas going
to y.
considered different behaviors for fish and replicas,
such as ‘fish goes to x’ and ‘replica goes to x’. Mak-
ing that distinction, we get that Eq. 12 reduces to
Py =
(
1 + a snfxfx s
nfy
fy s
nrx
rx s
nry
ry s
Nf−nfx−nfy
fu
)−1
. (23)
The Bayes Information Criterion rejects only pa-
rameter sfu. However, the addition of the new pa-
rameters that distinguish replica from real fish give
very small improvements in the fits compared to re-
sults of the simpler models in Eq. 17 and Eq. 22 (see
Fig. S1 and S3), suggesting that fish follow replicas
as much as they follow real fish.
Model including dependencies
In this section we will remove the hypothesis of in-
dependence among the behaviors of the other in-
dividuals (Eq. 6). We now consider that the focal
individual not only takes into account the behaviors
of the other animals at the time of decision but the
specific sequence of decisions that has taken place
before, {bi}
K−1
i=1 , being K − 1 the number of indi-
viduals that have decided before the focal one. For
example, the sequence {x, y} may give different in-
formation to the focal individual than the sequence
{y, x}. This is illustrated in Fig. 8A, where there
are two possible paths leading to states labeled as
1:1, but these two states are in different branches
of the tree (in contrast with Fig. 4, in which these
two states were collapsed in a single one).
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Figure 8. Model taking into account dependencies.
(A) Decision-making process according to the model with
dependencies, Eq. 25-33. Time runs from bottom to top.
Each box represents one state, and each edge represents one
option of the deciding individual, that either goes to x or
to y. Edge width is proportional to the probability of the
decision. (B) Probability of choosing y as a function of the
difference of the number of individuals that have already
chosen each option (∆n = ny − nx), for a′X = 5. In the
new model the probability does not depend any more on ∆n
alone, so states with the same ∆n have different values for the
probability (black dots). The area of the dots is proportional
to the probability of observing each state. Red line shows the
expected value of the probability for each value of ∆n. The
green line shows the probability for the model that neglects
dependencies (Eq. 17),
(
1 + s−∆n
)
−1
for s = 2.5.
To calculate the probability of the observed se-
quence of behaviors provided that Y is the correct
choice,
P ({bi}
K−1
i=1 |Y,CK), (24)
one can apply P (A,B) = P (A|B)P (B) repeatedly
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to obtain
P ({bi}
K−1
i=1 |Y,CK) =
K−1∏
k=1
P (bk|Y,CK , {bi}
k−1
i=1 ).
(25)
This expression substitutes the assumption of inde-
pendence in Eq. 6. Each of the terms in the prod-
uct is simply the probability that the k-th individ-
ual makes its decision, given the previous decisions,
and also given that y is the correct choice. This
result was expected since if we look at the tree in
Fig. 8A we see that the probability of reaching a
given state is simply the product of the probabili-
ties of choosing the adequate branches in each step.
So the problem reduces to computing the individ-
ual decision probabilities P (bk|Y,CK , {bi}
k−1
i=1 ). We
assume in the following that these probabilities are
calculated by the focal individual by assuming that
all animals use the same rules to make a decision.
The rule for the focal individual is, as in previous
sections,
PyK = P (Y |{bi}
K−1
i=1 , CK) =
1
1 + aK SK
, (26)
where the non-social and social terms are
aK =
P (X |CK)
P (Y |CK)
, (27)
and
SK =
P ({bi}
K−1
i=1 |X,CK)
P ({bi}
K−1
i=1 |Y,CK)
, (28)
respectively, and where we have added subscript K
to S, a and C to reflect that they apply to the
focal individual, that makes its decision in the K-th
place.
The assumption that all animals apply the same
rules translates into the following. To apply an
equation like Eq. 26 but on a different individual
(say, individual k) it is necessary to know the non-
social information Ck. Remember that all these
computations are made from the point of view of the
focal individual, and obviously the focal individual
does not have access to the non-social information
of the other individuals. It may seem reasonable for
the focal animal to assume that all the other indi-
viduals have the same non-social information (CK),
but this would result in no social behavior at all (if
the other individuals have the same non-social in-
formation, their behaviors will not give any extra in-
formation). Instead, one can assume that the other
individuals may have a different non-social informa-
tion, C′. Furthermore, this non-social information
depends on which is the best choice, because if for
example x is the best choice the other individuals
have some probability of detecting it, and therefore
their non-social information will be on average bi-
ased towards x. We approximate this average bias
by assuming that, if x (y) is the best choice, all
the other individuals will have non-social informa-
tion C′X (C
′
Y ) that will bias the decision towards x
(y). It is therefore the same to assume that x (y)
is the best option as to assume that all the other
individuals have non-social information C′X (C
′
Y ).
Therefore, for the probabilities of individual behav-
iors in Eq. 25, we have that
P (bk|Y,CK , {bi}
k−1
i=1 ) = P (bk|C
′
Y , CK , {bi}
k−1
i=1 ),
(29)
where now c′Y applies to the k-th individual, so we
can compute this probability simply by applying
Eq. 26 to the k-th individual,
Pyk,Y =
1
1 + a′Y Sk
, (30)
where
a′Y =
P (X |C′Y )
P (Y |C′Y )
. (31)
Then, if we denote Pbk,Y ≡ P (bk|C
′
Y , CK , {bi}
k−1
i=1 ),
we have that{
Pbk,Y = Pyk,Y if bk = y
Pbk,Y = 1− Pyk,Y if bk = x.
(32)
These are the individual probabilities needed in
Eq. 25, that takes into account the correlations
among the other individuals. So we can already
calculate Sk using Eq. 28,
Sk =
∏k−1
i=1 Pbi,X∏k−1
i=1 Pbi,Y
, (33)
Eqs. 30 and 33 have a recursive relation, because
we need the probabilities up to step k−1 to compute
Sk, and then we need Sk to compute the probabil-
ities in step k. At the beginning no individual has
made any choices, so we start with S1 = 1 and work
recursively from there until we obtain the probabil-
ities for individual K − 1, that allow to compute
SK . Then, we can already use Eq. 26 to compute
the decision probability of the focal individual, this
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time using its actual non-social term aK (which is
1 for the symmetric cases, and fitted to the data in
the non-symmetric case).
The equations above constitute the model taking
into account dependencies. The new parameters of
this model are a′X and a
′
Y , which substitute sx and
sy in the previous models, so the number of param-
eters is exactly the same. In the symmetrical case
we must have that a′X = 1/a
′
Y , so the model has
a single parameter. For the non-symmetrical case
these parameters may be independent of each other,
but we find good results even assuming that they
are not, as was the case for the simplified model.
So for simplicity we always assume that
a′X = 1/a
′
Y . (34)
For the case with different replicas at each side, each
of them has a different value of a′X , thus making one
replica more attractive than the other.
The new model also matches very well with the
experimental data discussed in this paper. Results
for the case of two different replicas are shown in
Fig. 9, for the symmetric case in Fig. S4 and for the
case with predator in Fig. S5. Fits are robust, and
all cases are well explained by the model with the
same value of a′X = 5, Fig. S6. See Figs. S1-S3 for
a comparison of all models.
We now ask how different is the model including
dependencies from the model that neglects them.
To compare the two models, we plot the probabil-
ity of going to y as a function of ∆n = ny − nx
for the new model, as we did in Fig. 1B for the
old one. The inclusion of dependencies has the con-
sequence that the probability of going to y does
not depend only on ∆n, since now different states
with the same ∆n may have different probabilities.
Therefore, when we plot the probability of going
to y as a function of ∆n we obtain different val-
ues of the probability for each value of ∆n. This
is shown by the black dots in Fig. 8B, where the
size of the dots is proportional to the probability of
observing each state when starting from 0:0. The
red line shows the average probability for each ∆n,
taking into account the probability of each state.
Both the dots and this line correspond to a′X = 5,
which is the one that fits best the data. The green
line corresponds to the probability for the simplest
model neglecting dependencies, with the value that
best fits to the data (s = 2.5). This line is close
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Figure 9. Comparison between model including de-
pendencies and stickleback choices with two differ-
ently modified replicas. (A) Schematic diagram of sym-
metric set-up with a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing
between two identical refugia and with one replica fish going
to x and a different one (in size, shape or pattern) going to
y (in red). (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final
configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repeti-
tions [43] (blue histogram) and results from model that takes
dependencies into account (red line, with a′
X,fish
= 4.8 and
a′
X,replicas
= 21.4, 11.8, 0.6, 9.9, 4.8, 0.9, 13, 8, 0.7, 14.5, 0.9,
for each type of replica (large, medium, small, fat, etc.); red
region: 95% confidence interval; green line with a′
X,fish
= 5
and same a′
X,replicas
as for red line). Different graphs corre-
spond to different stickleback group sizes and different types
of replicas going to x and y.
to the mean probability for the new model and to
the values with highest probability of occurrence,
so the simple model is as a good approximation to
the model with dependencies.
We find an interesting prediction of the new
model: There are some states in which the most
12
likely option is to choose the option chosen by fewer
individuals (for example, note in Fig. 8D that some
points with ∆n < 0 are above 0.5). This surpris-
ing result comes from the fact that, as more fish
accumulate at one side, their choices become less
and less informative (because it is very likely that
they are simply following the others). If then one
fish goes to the opposite side, its behavior is very
informative, because it is contradicting its social in-
formation. This effect can be so strong that it may
beat the effect of all the other individuals, resulting
in a higher probability of following this last individ-
ual than all the individuals that decided before.
Discussion
We have shown that probabilistic estimation in the
presence of uncertainty can explain collective ani-
mal decisions. This approach generated a new ex-
pression for each experimental manipulation, Eq.
17-22, and was naturally extended to test for more
refined cognitive capacities, Eq. 23. The model was
found to have a good correspondence with the data
in three experimental settings (Figs. 2, 6 and 7),
always giving a good fit with the social reliability
parameter s in the interval 2-4. Indeed, all the data
have a very good fit with s = 2.5 (Figs. 2, 6 and
7, green lines). According to Eq. 9, this value for
s has the interpretation that, for the behaviors rel-
evant for these experiments, the fish assume that
their conspecifics make the right choice 2.5 times
more often than the wrong choice.
For the data used in this paper, previous empir-
ical fits used more parameters [42] (Figs. S1-S3,
blue line), and added more complex behavioral rules
when the basic model failed [43] (Fig. S2, blue line).
Our approach thus gains in simplicity. It also finds
an expression for each set-up with expressions for
complex set-ups obtained with add-ons to those of
simpler set-ups, making the model scalable and eas-
ier to understand in terms of simpler experiments.
Also, taking the models as fits to experimental data,
the bayesian information criterion finds our models
to be better than those in [42] and [43] (see captions
in Figs. S1-S3 for details).
Collective animal behavior has been subject to a
particularly careful quantitative analysis. Previous
studies have given descriptions led by the powerful
idea that complex collective behaviors can emerge
from simple individual rules. In fact, some systems
have been found empirically to obey rules that are
mathematically similar or the same as some of the
ones presented in this paper, further supporting the
idea that probabilistic estimation might underlie
collective decision rules in many species. For ex-
ample, a function like the one in Eq. 17 has been
used to describe the behavior of Pharaoh’s ant [61],
a function like Eq. 22 for mosquito fish [62], and a
function like the one in the right-hand-side of Eq. 22
for meerkats [63]. But despite the importance of
group decisions in animals, little is known about the
origin of such simple individual rules. This paper
argues that probabilistic estimation can be an un-
derlying substrate for the rules explaining collective
decisions, thus helping in their evolutionary expla-
nation. Also, this connection between patterns in
animal collectives and a cognitive process helps to
explain the similarities that exist between decision-
making processes at the level of the brain and at
the level of animal collectives [64, 65].
Our model is naturally compatible with other
theories that use a Bayesian formalism to study dif-
ferent aspects of behavior and neurobiology, thus
contributing to a unified approach of information
processing in animals. For example, it may be com-
bined with the formalism of Bayesian foraging the-
ory [18], through an expansion of the non-social re-
liability a. Related to this case, a very well studied
example of use of social information is the one in
which one individual can observe directly the food
collected by another individual [29–33]. In this case
the social information is as unambiguous as the non-
social one, so in this case both types of information
should have a similar mathematical form [29–33].
This is consistent with our model, that in this case
will give a similar expression for a and S. Other
kinds of social information (such as another indi-
vidual’s decision to leave a food patch or choices of
females in mating [41]) would enter naturally in our
reliability terms sk. In discussing these and similar
problems, it has been proposed that animals should
use social information when their personal informa-
tion is poor, and ignore it otherwise [25,26,41]. Our
model provides a quantitative framework for this
problem, predicting that social information is al-
ways used, only with different weights with respect
to other sources of information. Bayesian estima-
tion is also a prominent approach to study decisions
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in neurobiology and psychology [3–17] and it would
be of interest to explore the mechanisms and role
played by the multiplicative relation between non-
social and social terms.
Our approach also makes a number of predic-
tions. For example, it derives the probability of
choosing among M options (see Eq. S16 of the
Text S1 ), that for the symmetric case reduces to
Pµ =

1 + M∑
m 6=µ
s−(nµ−nm)


−1
, (35)
predicted also to fit the data for cases with M > 2
options.
We also predict a quantitative link between es-
timation and collective behavior. The parameters
a and sk in our model are in fact not merely fit-
ting parameters, but true experimental variables.
Manipulations of a and sk should allow to test that
changes in collective behavior follow the predictions
of the model. A counterintuitive prediction about
the manipulation of sk is that external factors unre-
lated to the social component can nevertheless mod-
ify it. For example, a fish that usually finds food
in a given environment should interpret a sudden
turn of one of his mates as an indication that it
has found food, and therefore will follow it. In con-
trast, another fish that is not expected to find food
in that environment will not interpret the sudden
turn as indicative of food, and will not follow. Thus,
the model predicts that the a priori probability of
finding food (to which each fish can be trained in
isolation) will modify its propensity to follow con-
specifics. An alternative approach that would not
need manipulation of the reliabilities sk would con-
sist in showing that the probability of copying a
behavior increases with how reliably the behavior
informs about the environment.
We can also extend the estimation model to use,
instead of the location of animals, their predicted
location. We would then find expressions like the
ones in this paper but for the number or density of
individuals estimated for a later time. Consider for
example the case without non-social information,
described in Eq. 17 for two options and in Eq. 35
for more options. We can rewrite these equations
as Pµ = Ωs
nµ with µ one of the options and Ω
is the normalization, Ω =
∑M
m=1 s
nm , where M
is the number of options. Then, we would have
P (~x) = Ωsρ(~x;t+∆t) for the continuous case using
prediction. Future positions at times t+∆t (where
∆t does not need to be constant) in terms of vari-
ables at present time t would be given by ~x + ~v∆t
for animals moving at constant velocity ~v. Consider
then a simple case of an animal located at ~x and es-
timating the future position of a compact group at
~xg and moving with velocity ~vg. The deciding ani-
mal would be predicted to move with a high proba-
bility in the direction (~xg(t)− ~x(t)) + ∆t~vg(t). Es-
timation of future locations thus naturally predicts
in this simple case a particular form of ‘attraction’
and ‘alignment’ forces of dynamical empirical mod-
els [46, 66] as attraction to future positions, but in
the general also deviations from these simple rules.
Methods
Obtaining group behavior from the
model of an individual
The estimation rules presented in this paper refer
to a single individual. To simulate the behavior
of a group, we use the following algorithm: The
current individual decides between x and y. After
the decision, we recompute the relevant parameters
of the model and use the new values for the next
deciding individual. The undecided individuals are
only those that are waiting for their turn to decide.
We tested an alternative implementation in which
individuals may remain undecided or in which two
individuals can decide simultaneously, obtaining no
relevant differences.
For the case of the model including dependencies,
the model always starts at state 0:0, with S = 1.
Most experiments have initial conditions in which
several replicas are already going to either side, and
the fish have no information about the path followed
to reach this state. In these cases, we average the
probabilities of all the paths that might have pos-
sibly led to the initial state to compute the initial
value of S.
Protocol S1 and Protocol S2, contain Matlab
functions that run the models (extensions of the
files must be changed from .txt to .m to make them
operative). Protocol S1 corresponds to the model
without dependencies, and Protocol S2 corresponds
to the model with dependencies. These functions
have been used to generate all the theoretical re-
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sults presented in this paper.
Fits
We computed log likelihood as the logarithm of
the probability that the histograms come from the
model. We searched for the model parameters giv-
ing a higher value of log likelihood, corresponding
to a better fit. This search was performed by opti-
mizing each parameter separately (keeping the rest
constant) and iterating through all parameters until
convergence. In all cases convergence was rapidly
achieved. We performed multiple searches for best
fitting parameters starting from random initial con-
ditions and always found convergence to the same
values, suggesting there are no local maxima. In-
deed, we observed that log-likelihood is smooth and
with a single maximum in all the cases with 1 or 2
parameters (see Fig. 3 for an example).
Bayesian Information Criterion
For model comparison we used the Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) [59, 60], which takes into
account both goodness of fit and the number of pa-
rameters. According to this criterion, among sev-
eral models that have been fitted to maximize log
likelihood, one should select the one for which
BICi = Li −
1
2
ki log(h) (36)
is largest, where Li is the logarithm of the probabil-
ity that the data comes from the i-th model once its
parameters have been optimized to maximize this
probability, ki is its number of parameters of the
i-th model and h is the number of measurements
(which in our case is the same for all models).
More intuitive than the direct BICi values in
Eq. 36 are the BIC weights, defined as [60]
wi =
exp(BICi)∑
j exp(BICj)
, (37)
when we assume that all models are a priori equally
likely. Roughly speaking, wi can be interpreted as
the probability that model i is the most correct one
[60].
We used BIC to compare different versions of our
model, and also to compare our model with those
of references [42, 43] (see Figs. S1-S3). The models
of refs. [42, 43] were originally fitted by minimizing
the mean squared error instead of by maximizing
logprob. For this reason, they score very poorly in
BIC with their reported parameters. For this rea-
son, we re-optimized for maximum logprob all their
model parameters (these parameters are, using the
notation of refs. [42, 43], a, k, T , m and r, with r
only applicable in the case of predator present). For
the case of different replicas going to each side, pa-
rameter pbias takes a different value for each row
in the figure, adding up to 10 parameters. The
model in ref. [43] is computationally expensive, so
it is not feasible to re-optimize these many param-
eters. Therefore, we treated them as if they were
independently measured: we fixed pbias in each case
so that the results of the trials with a single indi-
vidual matched exactly the model’s prediction (as
reported in [43]). We also followed this procedure
with the ratios sr/sR of our model without depen-
dencies, and the pairs a′X,replicas in our model with
dependencies. Then, we performed BIC taking into
account neither these parameters (pbias the ratios
sr/sR and the pairs a
′
X,replicas) nor the data from
trials using single individuals.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge useful comments by Sara Arganda,
Larissa Conradt, Iain Couzin, Jacques Gautrais,
David Sumpter, Guy Theraulaz, Julia´n Vicente
Page and COLMOT 2010 participants.
15
References
1. Box G, Tiao G (1973) Bayesian inference in statistical analysis. New York: Addison-Wesley. URL
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118033197.fmatter/summary.
2. Jaynes ET, Bretthorst LG (2003) Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (Vol 1). Cambridge
University Press.
3. Helmholtz H (1925) Physiological Optics, Vol. III: The perceptions of Vision. Rochester, NY, USA:
Optical Society of America.
4. Mach E (1980) Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations. Chicago, IL, USA: Open Court
Publishing Co.
5. Knill DC, Pouget A (2004) The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and
computation. Trends in neurosciences 27: 712–9.
6. Jacobs R (1999) Optimal integration of texture and motion cues to depth. Vision Research 39:
3621–3629.
7. Knill DC, Saunders JA (2003) Do humans optimally integrate stereo and texture information for
judgments of surface slant? Vision Research 43: 2539–2558.
8. Ernst MO, Banks MS (2002) Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically
optimal fashion. Nature 415: 429–33.
9. Battaglia PW, Jacobs RA, Aslin RN (2003) Bayesian integration of visual and auditory signals for
spatial localization. Journal of the Optical Society of America A 20: 1391.
10. Alais D, Burr D (2004) The ventriloquist effect results from near-optimal bimodal integration.
Current Biology 14: 257–262.
11. Gold JI, Shadlen MN (2001) Neural computations that underlie decisions about sensory stimuli.
Trends in cognitive sciences 5: 10–16.
12. Kording KP, Wolpert DM (2004) Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning. Nature 427: 244–
247.
13. Ko¨rding KP, Wolpert DM (2006) Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control. Trends in
cognitive sciences 10: 319–26.
14. Gold JI, Shadlen MN (2007) The neural basis of decision making. Annual review of neuroscience
30: 535–74.
15. Courville AC, Daw ND, Touretzky DS (2006) Bayesian theories of conditioning in a changing world.
Trends in cognitive sciences 10: 294–300.
16. Kruschke JK (2006) Locally Bayesian learning with applications to retrospective revaluation and
highlighting. Psychological review 113: 677–99.
17. Tenenbaum JB, Kemp C, Griffiths TL, Goodman ND (2011) How to Grow a Mind: Statistics,
Structure, and Abstraction. Science 331: 1279–1285.
18. Oaten A (1977) Optimal foraging in patches: A case for stochasticity. Theoretical Population
Biology 12: 263–285.
16
19. Biernaskie JM, Walker SC, Gegear RJ (2009) Bumblebees learn to forage like Bayesians. The
American naturalist 174: 413–423.
20. Alonso J (1995) Patch use in cranes: a field test of optimal foraging predictions. Animal Behaviour
49: 1367–1379.
21. McNamara JM, Green RF, Olsson O (2006) Bayes theorem and its applications in animal behaviour.
Oikos 112: 243–251.
22. Valone TJ (2006) Are animals capable of Bayesian updating? An empirical review. Oikos 112:
252–259.
23. Valone TJ, Templeton JJ (2002) Public information for the assessment of quality: a widespread
social phenomenon. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological
sciences 357: 1549–57.
24. Blanchet S, Clobert J, Danchin E (2010) The role of public information in ecology and conservation:
an emphasis on inadvertent social information. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1195:
149–68.
25. Dall SRX, Giraldeau LA, Olsson O, McNamara JM, Stephens DW (2005) Information and its use
by animals in evolutionary ecology. Trends in ecology & evolution 20: 187–93.
26. Giraldeau LA, Valone TJ, Templeton JJ (2002) Potential disadvantages of using socially acquired
information. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological sciences
357: 1559–66.
27. Wagner RH, Danchin E (2010) A taxonomy of biological information. Oikos 119: 203–209.
28. King AJ, Cowlishaw G (2007) When to use social information: the advantage of large group size
in individual decision making. Biology letters 3: 137–9.
29. Valone TJ (1989) Group Foraging, Public Information, and Patch Estimation. Oikos 56: 357–363.
30. Templeton JJ, Giraldeau LA (1995) Patch assessment in foraging flocks of European starlings:
Evidence for the use of public information. Behavioral Ecology 6: 65–72.
31. Templeton JJ, Giraldeau LA (1996) Vicarious sampling: The use of personal and public information
by starlings foraging in a simple patchy environment. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 38:
105–14.
32. Smith JW, Benkman CW, Coffey K (1999) The use and misuse of public information by foraging
red crossbills. Behavioral Ecology 10: 54–62.
33. Clark C, Mangel M (1986) The evolutionary advantages of group foraging. Theoretical Population
Biology 30: 45–75.
34. Doligez B, Danchin E, Clobert J (2002) Public information and breeding habitat selection in a wild
bird population. Science (New York, NY) 297: 1168–70.
35. Boulinier T, Danchin E (1997) The use of conspecific reproductive success for breeding patch
selection in terrestrial migratory species. Evolutionary Ecology 11: 505–517.
36. Coolen I, van Bergen Y, Day RL, Laland KN (2003) Species difference in adaptive use of public
information in sticklebacks. Proceedings Biological sciences / The Royal Society 270: 2413–9.
17
37. van Bergen Y, Coolen I, Laland KN (2004) Nine-spined sticklebacks exploit the most reliable source
when public and private information conflict. Proceedings Biological sciences / The Royal Society
271: 957–62.
38. Rieucau G, Giraldeau La (2009) Persuasive companions can be wrong: the use of misleading social
information in nutmeg mannikins. Behavioral Ecology 20: 1217–1222.
39. Lima SL (1995) Collective detection of predatory attack by social foragers: fraught with ambiguity?
Animal Behaviour 50: 1097–1108.
40. Proctor CJ, Broom M, Ruxton GD (2001) Modelling antipredator vigilance and flight response in
group foragers when warning signals are ambiguous. Journal of theoretical biology 211: 409–17.
41. Nordell, Valone TJ (1998) Mate choice copying as public information. Ecology Letters 1: 74–76.
42. Ward AJW, Sumpter DJT, Couzin ID, Hart PJB, Krause J (2008) Quorum decision-making facil-
itates information transfer in fish shoals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 105: 6948–53.
43. Sumpter DJT, Krause J, James R, Couzin ID, Ward AJW (2008) Consensus decision making by
fish. Current Biology 18: 1773–1777.
44. Couzin ID, Krause J (2003) Self-organization and collective behavior in vertebrates. Advances in
the Study of Behavior 32: 1–75.
45. Sumpter DJT (2006) The principles of collective animal behaviour. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences 361: 5–22.
46. Couzin ID, Krause J, Franks NR, Levin SA (2005) Effective leadership and decision-making in
animal groups on the move. Nature 433: 513–516.
47. Katz Y, Tunstrom K, Ioannou CC, Huepe C, Couzin ID (2011) Inferring the structure and dynamics
of interactions in schooling fish. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences : 1–6.
48. Neyman J, Pearson E (1933) On the problem of the most efficient tests of statistical hypothe-
ses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series A, Containing Papers of a
Mathematical or Physical Character 231: 289.
49. Herrnstein R (1961) Relative and absolute strength of response as a function of frequency of
reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 4: 267.
50. Behrend ER, Bitterman ME (1961) Probability-Matching in the Fish. The American Journal of
Psychology 74.
51. Greggers U, Menzel R (1993) Memory dynamics and foraging strategies of honeybees. Behavioral
Ecology and Sociobiology 32: 17–29.
52. Kirk KL, Bitterman ME (1965) Probability-Learning by the Turtle. Science 148: 1484–1485.
53. Vulkan N (2000) An Economist’s Perspective on Probability Matching. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys 14: 101–118.
54. Wozny DR, Beierholm UR, Shams L (2010) Probability matching as a computational strategy used
in perception. PLoS Computational Biology 6: 7.
18
55. Staddon J (1983) Adaptive Behavior and Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. URL
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/2878.
56. Fretwell S, Lucas H (1969) On territorial behavior and other factors influencing habitat distribution
in birds. Acta biotheoretica 19: 16–36.
57. Houston A, McNamara J (1987) Switching between resources and the ideal free distribution. Animal
behaviour 35: 301–302.
58. Gaissmaier W, Schooler LJ (2008) The smart potential behind probability matching. Cognition
109: 416–22.
59. Schwarz G (1978) Estimating the dimension of a model. The annals of statistics 6: 461–464.
60. Link W (2006) Model weights and the foundations of multimodel inference. Ecology 87: 2626–2635.
61. Jeanson R, Ratnieks FLW, Deneubourg JL (2003) Pheromone trail decay rates on different sub-
strates in the Pharaoh’s ant, Monomorium pharaonis. Physiological Entomology 28: 192–198.
62. Ward AJW, Herbert-Read JE, Sumpter DJT, Krause J (2011) Fast and accurate decisions through
collective vigilance in fish shoals. PNAS 108: 6–9.
63. Bousquet CAH, Sumpter DJT, Manser MB (2010) Moving calls: a vocal mechanism underlying
quorum decisions in cohesive groups. Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences in
press.
64. Marshall JaR, Bogacz R, Dornhaus A, Planque´ R, Kovacs T, et al. (2009) On optimal decision-
making in brains and social insect colonies. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal
Society 6: 1065–74.
65. Couzin ID (2009) Collective cognition in animal groups. Trends in cognitive sciences 13: 36–43.
66. Couzin ID, Krause J, James R, Ruxton GD, Franks NR (2010) Collective memory and spatial
sorting in animal groups. Journal of Theoretical Biology 218: 1–11.
19
Supporting Figures
Group size
2 4 8
Replicas
going to
x:y
1:1
2:2
0:1
1:2
0:2
1:3
0:3
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
0
0.5
0
0.5
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0
0.5
0
0.5
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
0 0.5 1
Proportion of fish going to y
0 0.5 1
x y Behaviour of each individual:
Py = a+
(m− a)(ny(t)− ny(t − T))
k
nu(t)k + (ny(t)− ny(t − T))k + (nx(t)− nx(t − T))k
Py =
(
1 + s−∆n
)
−1
Py =
(
1 + s
−∆nf
f
s−∆nrr
)
−1
Py = (1 + aS)
−1 ;Dependent model with parameter a′X
Figure S1. Comparison between different models for the symmetric set-up. Experimentally measured statistics
of final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histograms). Red line: results from our
single-parameter model assuming independence in Eq. 17 in the main text (s = 2.2). Green line: Enhanced model assuming
independence with different reliability for the replicas (sf = 3, sr = 1.76). Yellow line: Model including dependencies
(a′
X
= 4.9). Blue line: Empirical model presented in Ref. [42], using the parameters reported there. Different graphs
correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas going to x and y. According to Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC, see Methods), the best model is our model with dependencies (yellow line, logprob L = −394,
and BIC weight w = 0.996. Second-best is the complicated version of the model without dependencies (green line, logprob
L = −396, and BIC weight w = 0.004). Third-best is our one-parameter model assuming independence (red line, L = −419,
w = 3 · 10−11). And last (but not far from the third one) the model from Ref. [42] (blue line, L = −411 w = 5 · 10−13). For
the model from Ref. [42], L and w correspond to a re-optimization of the model as described in Methods, because using the
parameters reported in [42] would perform worse).
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Figure S2. Comparison between different models for the condition with two different replicas. Experimentally
measured statistics of final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [43] (blue histograms). Red line:
results from model in Eq. 20 in the main text (sf = 2.9, sr/sR = 0.35, 0.7, 0.5, 0.52, 0.69, 0.75, 0.43, 0.55, 0.78, 0.43 for
each row from top to bottom). Yellow line: Model including dependencies (a′X = 4.8, a
′
X,replicas
= 21.4, 11.8, 0.6, 9.9,
4.8, 0.9, 13, 8, 0.7, 14.5, 0.9 for each type of replica (large, medium, small, etc.). Blue line: Empirical model presented in
Ref. [43], using the parameters reported there. Different graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different
types of replicas going to x and y. According to Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, see Methods), our model neglecting
dependencies gives the best representation of the data (red line, logprob L = −783, and BIC weight w = 0.9985). Second-
best is out model including dependencies, (L = −788, w = 0.001). Last, but near the second one, is the model from ref. [43]
(blue line, L = −781 w = 0.0005. For the model from Ref. [43], these values of L and w correspond to a re-optimization
of the model as described in Methods, because using the parameters reported in [43] would perform worse). The values of
logprob (L) reported here do not include the data of the single-individual experiments (see Methods).
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Figure S3. Comparison between different models in the asymmetrical set-up. Experimentally measured statistics
of final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histograms). Red line: results from model
neglecting dependencies in Eq. 22 in the main text (s = 2.6, a = 9.5). Green line: Enhanced model neglecting dependencies
with different reliability for the fish going to different locations and for the replicas (a = 5.5, sfx = 50, sfy = 2/3, sry = 0.36.
srx has no effect because there are no replicas going to x). Yellow line: Two-parameter model including dependencies
(a = 9.94, a′X = 8.66). Blue line: Empirical model presented in Ref. [42], using the parameters reported there. Different
graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas going to y. According to Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC, see Methods), the best two models are our complicated version neglecting dependencies (green
line, logprob L = −225, and BIC weight w = 0.52) and our two-parameter model including dependencies (yellow line,
L = −231, w = 0.38). Next (but very near) is our simplified model (red line, L = −232, w = 0.098). And last (and
significantly worse) the model from Ref. [42] (blue line, L = −234 w = 2.5 · 10−6. For the model from Ref. [42], the values
of L and w correspond to a re-optimization of the model as described in Methods, because using the parameters reported
in [42] would perform worse. In two of the graphs for group size 1 that there are no data the prediction of the model from
Ref. [42] and our model (especially the simplest version) are opposite. It might be that the results changed completely,
depending on the results of these graphs, were the experiments performed. But we found that this is not the case: We
performed simulations, adding experimental data in these two graphs. Even in the extreme case that the fabricated results
matched exactly the predictions of the model in Ref. [42], BIC would still favour two of our models (we would get L = −254,
w = 0.99 for our model with dependence, L = −252, w = 0.01 for our complicated model neglecting dependence, L = −268,
w = 8 · 10−7 for our simplified model neglecting dependence and L = −258, w = 3 · 10−6 for the model in [42]).
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Figure S4. Comparison between model including dependencies and stickleback choices in symmetric set-
up. (A) Schematic diagram of symmetric set-up with a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing between two identical
refugia and with different numbers of replica fish (in red) going to x and y. (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final
configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histogram) and results from the model that takes
into account dependencies (red line using a′X = 4.9; red region: 95% confidence interval; green line with a
′
X = 5). Different
graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas going to x and y.
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Figure S5. Comparison between model including dependencies and stickleback choices in asymmetric set-
up. A) Schematic diagram of asymmetric set-up (predator at y, large fish depicted in red) with a group of sticklebacks (in
black) choosing between two refugia, and replica fish (small fish depicted in red) going to y. (B) Experimentally measured
statistics of final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histogram) and results from the
model that takes into account the dependencies (red line using a′X = 8.7, a = 9.9; red region: 95% confidence interval.
Green line using a′X = 5 and a = 6.28). Different graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different
number of replicas going to y.
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Figure S6. Goodness of fit of the model including dependencies for different values of a′
X
. Red: Symmetric
case (data in Fig. S4). Green: Case with different replicas at each side (data in Fig. 9. The parameters a′
X,replicas
are
re-optimized for each value of a′
X
). Blue: Asymmetric set-up with predator on one side (data in Fig. S5; Parameter a is
re-optimized for each value of a′
X
). (A) Root mean squared error between the data and the probabilities predicted by the
model. Grey dashed line shows the mean RMSE for the three cases. The absolute values for each case depend on the shape
of the data and are not comparable, only the trends and the position of the minima should be compared. (B) Logarithm
of the probability that the data come from the model. The height of each curve depends on the number of data for each
experiment, only the trend and the position of the maxima should be compared. Grey dashed line shows the sum of the
three coloured lines, but shifted by 1000 so that it fits on the scale. The peak of this global probability indicates the value
of a′
X
that best fits the three datasets (a′
X
= 5).
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Supporting text: Model for more
than 2 options
We present a derivation of the model for the more
general case of M different options (instead of the
2 options used in the main text). We also discuss
some particular cases that give simple expressions
while still widely applicable.
Model for M options
Let M be the number of possible options, ym, m =
1 . . .M . Each individual estimates the probability
that each option is the best one, using its non-social
information (C) and the behavior of the other in-
dividuals (B). So for one given option, say yµ, we
want to compute
P (Yµ|C,B), (S1)
where Yµ stands for ’yµ is the best option’. We
can compute the probability in Eq. S1 using Bayes’
theorem,
P (Yµ|C,B) =
P (B|Yµ, C)P (Yµ|C)∑M
m=1 P (B|Ym, C)P (Ym|C)
. (S2)
Dividing numerator and denominator by the numer-
ator, we get
P (Yµ|C,B) =
1∑M
m=1 amµSmµ
, (S3)
where
amµ =
P (Ym|C)
P (Yµ|C)
(S4)
contains only non-social information, and
Smµ =
P (B|Ym, C)
P (B|Yµ, C)
(S5)
contains the social information. Note that each
term of the summation preserves the multiplicative
relation between social and non-social information
that was also apparent in Eq. 3 of the main text.
There may beM−1 independent non-social param-
eters amµ in the case that no two options have equal
non-social information. But usually this will not be
the case, and the number of independent non-social
parameters will be lower.
Now we assume independence among behaviors
(Eq. 6 in main text), and group all possible be-
haviors in L classes, {βk}
L
k=1 (Eq. 7 in main text).
These two assumptions transform Eq. S5 into
Smµ =
L∏
k=1
snkk,mµ, (S6)
where nk is the number of individuals performing
behavior βk, and
sk,mµ =
P (βk|Ym, C)
P (βk|Yµ, C)
(S7)
are the reliability parameters for behavior βk with
respect to options ym and yµ. There may be up
to L(M −1) independent reliability parameters but
usually they will not be all independent.
In summary, from Equations S3 and S6 we have
that
P (Yµ|C,B) =
(
M∑
m=1
amµ
L∏
k=1
snkk,mµ
)−1
. (S8)
This equation summarizes the general model ap-
plicable to any kind of experiment. In the follow-
ing sections we consider two particular cases with a
much simpler expression.
One basic reliability parameter
The general model in Eq. S8 depends in general on
L(M −1) independent reliability parameters sk,mµ.
Here we derive the model for a particular case in
which there is only one reliability parameter, s.
First, we consider classes of behaviors (from now
on we call them just ‘behaviors’) that simply con-
sist of choosing a given option. If for example the
options are different places, behaviors would be go-
ing to each of those places. Therefore, the number
of possible behaviors is the same as the number of
options, L = M . We use the convention that βj is
‘choosing option yj’. Note that when a behavior is
not informative (i.e. its reliability parameter is 1)
it has no impact on the model in Eq. S8. There-
fore, considering this set of behaviors is equivalent
to assuming that all other behaviors have reliability
parameter equal to 1.
We further assume that P (βk|Ym, C) only de-
pends on whether k = m or k 6= m, so that
P (βk|Yk, C) = P (βl|Yl, C)
P (βk|Ym, C) = P (βl|Yp, C), k 6= m, l 6= p
(S9)
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Note that P (βk|Yk, C) is the probability that an-
other individual makes the correct choice, and
P (βk|Ym, C)with k 6= m is the probability that it
makes a wrong choice. So this assumption means
that the probability of making the correct choice is
the same regardless of which option is actually the
correct one. In the case of symmetric choices, in
which non-social information C is the same for all
options, this relation will hold automatically, not
being an extra assumption. It is likely that it also
holds for many asymmetric choices. For example,
the results for the asymmetric set-up presented in
the main text suggest that it holds in that case. We
define
pc ≡ P (βk|Yk, C)
pf ≡ P (βk|Ym, C), k 6= m.
(S10)
As it only matters whether the behavior matches
the correct choice or not, there are only four distinct
types of reliability parameters sk,mµ (Eq. S7):
sk,kk =
P (βk|Yk, C)
P (βk|Yk, C)
=
pc
pc
= 1
sk,ml =
P (βk|Ym, C)
P (βk|Yl, C)
=
pf
pf
= 1, k 6= m, k 6= l
sk,km =
P (βk|Yk, C)
P (βk|Ym, C)
=
pc
pf
= s, k 6= m
sk,mk =
P (βk|Ym, C)
P (βk|Yk, C)
=
pf
pc
=
1
s
, k 6= m,
(S11)
where
s ≡
pc
pf
(S12)
is the basic reliability parameter, equal to the prob-
ability that another individual makes the correct
choice over the probability that it makes a mistake,
for any behavior and for any individual. We regroup
the terms inEq. S8 so that it reflects the different
types of sk,mµ (Eq. S11), and get
P (Yµ|C,B) =(
M∑
m=1
amµs
nm
m,mµs
nµ
µ,mµ
L∏
k=1
k 6=m
k 6=µ
snkk,mµ
)−1
. (S13)
Using the relations in Eq. S11 we have that
P (Yµ|C,B) =
(
M∑
m=1
amµs
−(nµ−nm)
)−1
. (S14)
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Figure S7. Probability of choosing one of the options for
the 3-choice symmetric case.
Note that the term m = µ is always equal to 1, so
Eq. S14 is identical to
P (Yµ|C,B) =
(
1+
M∑
m=1
m 6=µ
amµs
−(nµ−nm)
)−1
, (S15)
that has the same structure as the equations pre-
sented in the main text.
Symmetric case
In the special case that all options are indistinguish-
able using non-social information alone (symmetric
case), all non-social parameters amµ are equal 1 and
Eq. S15 becomes
P (Yµ|C,B) =
(
1 +
M∑
m=1
m 6=µ
s−(nµ−nm)
)−1
. (S16)
We recall that in this case Eq. S9 holds automati-
cally, not being an extra assumption.
In the particular case of 3 options, x, y, z, we
have
P (X |C,B) =
(
1 + s−(nx−ny) + s−(nx−nz)
)−1
,
(S17)
and the corresponding expressions for P (Y |C,B)
and P (Z|C,B). Fig. S7 shows P (X |C,B) in terms
of its two effective variables, nx − ny and nx − nz
(Eq. S17).
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